Intellexa makes corrections on a Greek Intelligence Service document
In 2022, the commander of the Greek Intelligence Service put together with his North Macedonian interlocutor a draft preliminary agreement for cooperation on cybersecurity. But they forgot to remove a subtle, albeit very important electronic trace, which was seen by inside story. This is Part B of the investigation resulting from Inside Story's partnership with the Investigative Reporting Lab in Skopje.
Tal Dilian’s group of companies developed and sold the Predator spyware in North Macedonia and Greece – so much we know already. What we did not know so far, was how the state agencies of the two countries attempted to cooperate on the matter –and almost concluded an agreement– before the 2022 spyware revelations in Greece sabotaged their operation.
| Μπορείτε να διαβάσετε την ελληνική εκδοχή του άρθρου εδώ. You can read the Greek version of this article here. |
Key points of this investigation
Inside Story in Athens and the Investigative Reporting Lab (IRL) in Skopje reveal today:
- The Greek government's desire to legalise the state’s use of spyware, along the standards of North Macedonia.
- The content of the classified preliminary agreement put together in 2022 by then Greek National Intelligence Service (NIS) commander Panagiotis Kontoleon and the head of the Operational Technical Agency Skopje (OTA) Zoran Angelovski.
- The existence of an open channel of communication between the Greek Prime Minister's Office under Grigoris Dimitriadis, and Intellexa, the vendor of Predator spyware that has infected –or attempted to infect– the mobile phones of